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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, an understanding has emerged that the federal government needs 
to run more efficiently and improve accountability. As companies are accountable to 
shareholders, the federal government is accountable to taxpayers. Under the Government 
Performance and Results act of 1993 (GPRA) every major federal agency must be able to 
set goals, measure performance, and report on their accomplishments. (GAO- 1 18,1996) 
The DoD and the Navy have been working to develop base management and 
quality standards, to improve the efficiency and improve accountability of base 
management. The Department of the Navy’s Strategic Plan states that Naval bases must 
provide high-quality services to fleet units worldwide at a level necessary to sustain both 
personnel morale and combat readiness. (OPNAV, 1995) To meet GPRA requirements, 
realize potential fiscal savings, and ensure that the requisite levels of service are 
provided, measurable Navy wide performance standards for key services must be 
developed. (OPNAV, 1995) 
This thesis examines the difficulties the Navy has had in trying to establish 
performance measures for their shore installations. Further, it will review current 
performance measurement models used in the public sector and recommend a model that 
best fits the Installation Core Business Model in order to aid installation commanders in 
meeting GPRA’s performance requirements. 
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In any era of declining budgets and increased resource accountability, it has been 
increasingly important to identify shore installation core performance areas and set 
performance measurement standards. This thesis examines the process of defining 
performance measures for shore installations. The goal of this thesis is to recommend a 
performance measure model for shore installations that can be used by regional 
commanders to improve performance in core areas. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Department of Defense maintains about 450 bases to support national 
security operations. These bases are operated by the four military services (active and 
reserve components) and Defense Logistics Agency. Each installation contains one or 
more of a variety of mission activities, as well as a variety of service activities, much like 
those found in most communities. 
Installation management is a support element (managing a set of activities) within 
DoD. Installation managers are responsible for ensuring the availability of responsive 
base services and effective facilitiei to customer organizations and authorized individuals 
and families. (Ammons,l996) These facilities and services are provided subject to 
prevailing standards, which recognize budget constraints. 
In recent years, an understanding has emerged that the federal government needs 
to run more efficiently and improve accountability to taxpayers. Under the Government 
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Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) every major federal agency must be able 
to set goals, measure performance, and report on their accomplishments. (GAO-118, 
1996) 
The DoD and the Navy have been working to develop base management and 
quality standards, to improve the efficiency and accountability of base management. The 
Department of the Navy’s Strategic Plan states that Naval bases must provide high- 
quality services to fleet units worldwide at a level necessary to sustain both personnel 
morale and combat readiness. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) To meet the 
Government Performance and Results Act s (GPRA) requirements, realize potential 
fiscal savings, and ensure that the requisite levels of service are provided, measurable 
Navy wide performance standards for key services must be developed. (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1995) 
However, lacking measurement data and business experience, the Navy has had 
difficulty establishing baselines for shore installation performance measurement. In an 
effort to overcome this, the Navy established a Performance Standards and Measurement 
System Action Team to review existing Shore Installation Management (SIM) processes 
and management tools and to establish and implement a Performance Standards Strategy. 
(Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) 
OPNAV’s Performance Standards Strategy states that it will take advantage of 
existing industry standards to speed development of benchmarking standards. The 
strategy also suggests combining expertise from the private and public sector with Navy 
Installation and hct ional  experts to expedite the process. (Chief of Naval Operations, 
1995) Newly regionalized Echelon I1 staffs were directed to work with Navy and 
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publidprivate sector functional experts to develop standards and measures for 
installations. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) 
Installation Managers have been instructed to utilize information tools, such as 
Installation Transfer and Exchange (INSITE), Installation Management and Accounting 
Project (IMAP), Navy Accounting System STARS-FL as well as Smart Base initiatives, 
such as Multi-technology Automated Reader Card (MARC), to aid in processing 
information on existing functional data. IMAP includes the Installation Core Business 
Model, which defines the core businesses of shore installations: Airfield Support, Port 
Support, Other Mission Support, Community Support (QOL), Facility Management, 
Public Safety and Command Support. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) 
This thesis examines the difficulties the Navy has had in trying to 
establish performance measures for their shore installations. Further, it reviews current 
performance measurement models used in the public sector and recommends a model that 
best fits the Installation Core Business Model in order to aid installation commanders in 
meeting the Government Performance and Results Act’s (GPRA) performance 
requirements. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: “How should 
the Navy implement performance measures at Navy shore installations?” and “What 
areas should be measured?” A subsidiary research question is: “Can the Navy effectively 
implement a performance measurement plan?’ 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
Preparing this thesis involved a thorough literature review. Interviews with key 
management personnel at CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT were used to identify 
current practices and performance measurement needs. Based on these resources, an 
analytic model was developed encompassing core shore businesses and performance 
measurement techniques in appropriate areas. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I1 contains a discussion on the Government Performance and Results Act, 
its requirements and implementation. The concept of strategic plans and performance 
measures is introduced and different performance measures are identified and discussed. 
Chapter 111 looks at the Navy’s core business model for shore installations and 
analyzes current Navy Installation performance measurement plans. 
Chapter IV reviews interview data on performance measurement implementation 
from key shore installation management personnel assigned to various regions under 
CINPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT. City Government plans are discussed as 
performance measurement models for shore installations. This chapter also identifies, 
discusses and defines a recommended performance measurement model for use by shore 
managers. 
Chapter V contains the conclusions of the study and recommendations. 
Suggested topics for hture study are also provided. 
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11. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides an overview of performance measures. Further, it discusses 
performance measures used in government and outlines the requirements of the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). This chapter also briefly defines the 
different types of measures and measurement systems in use today. 
A. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN GOVERNMENT 
Assessing service performance is not new. Organizations throughout history have 
used performance measure to gage how well they are conducting business. Government 
agencies are no different. Measuring workload and worker efficiency was part of the 
scientific approach at the turn of the century. Back in 1938, the International City 
Managers Association (ICMA) issued Measuring Municipal Activities, which suggested 
various types of information that local governments might use to monitor various local 
services and to assess how well these services are delivered. 
Some 50 years ago, at the federal level, the Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch of Government, also known as the Hoover Commissions, worked 
successfully to streamline a federal government grown too large and too disorganized 
because of the Great Depression and then World War 11. The commission utilized 
performance-based budgeting, with an emphasis on efficiency measures as expressed by 
the cost or number of hours per unit of output. (Hatry, 1989) 
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In more modem times, concern for measuring performance in public 
programmatic entities arose with the interest in program budgeting in the 1960s and 
program evaluation in the 1970’s. Hatry and colleagues at the Urban Institute began 
publishing materials that promoted performance measures and provided instruction on 
how to use them, while others talked about how to incorporate them in larger 
management processes. (Poister & Strieb, 1999) 
A number of forces in the field of public administration have led to a renewed 
interest in performance measurement in the 1990s. Taxpayer revolts, pressure for 
privatization of public services, legislative initiatives aimed at controlling runaway 
spending, and the devolution of many responsibilities to lower levels of government have 
generated increased demands to hold the government accountable for what they spend 
and the results they produce. (Poister & Strieb, 1999) Responding to these forces, Vice 
President A1 Gore’s 1993 National Performance Review (NPR) called for a new way of 
thinking about how public agency performance is defined and measured. 
The renewed emphasis on performance measurement was further stimulated by 
resolutions from the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), the American Society for Public 
Administration (ASPA) and the National Governors’ Association (NGA). These 
resolutions urged governments to institute systems for goal setting and performance 
measurement. At the National level, the thrust toward results-orientated public 
management is embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 
1993, which requires strategic planning and performance reporting by agencies 
throughout the federal government. 
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Measuring strategic performance of program outcomes is a relatively new 
challenge for federal bureaus, because they are accustomed to measuring inputs. 
(Whittaker, 1995) When the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was first 
implemented, many felt that government management was somehow "different," that the 
same rules that applied to the private sector could not apply to the public, or at least not 
in the same way. (NPR, 1999) Opponents of the Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA) have suggested that it will not work in government because government 
agencies do not have a bottom line or profit margin. The Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) supporters argue that government agencies do have a bottom line, 
their mission: what they want to achieve. (NPR,1999) Recent efforts have shown that the 
basic concepts do apply to the public sector; they can also be used to create a successful 
organization. (Poister & Strieb, 1999) For example, agencies may not have a financial 
bottom line, but they do have goals and outcomes that can indicate success (e.g., 
reduction in pollution). 
Regardless of viewpoint, there is a growing trend in government toward 
performance-based management systems. (Poister & Strieb, 1999) Currently, all but 
three states have performance-based budgeting requirements, most of which have been 
established recently. (Melkers & Willoughby, 1998) Thirty-one states have legislated 
performance-based budgeting mandates. Sixteen states have initiated this reform through 
budget guidelines or instructions. (Melkers & Willoughby, 1998) The May 12, 1992, 
edition of Financial World magazine labeled performance measurement and program 
evaluation as perhaps the most important trend in state government in the 1990's. In 
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1995, North Carolina’s Office of State Planning described the relationship of 
performance measures to its state budget and planning process in the following way: 
Performance planning is a key component to more efficient and effective 
government. Performance planning provides agencies the opportunity to 
evaluate whether programs are doing the right thing (effective) in the right 
way (efficient). (Melkers & Willoughby, 1998, p.68) 
The use of program goal setting and performance measures is also a growing 
trend in municipal governments. (Poister & Strieb, 1999) Surveys of municipal managers 
found that between 30-70 percent of U. S .  cities used performance-monitoring systems. 
(Poister & Strieb, 1999) In 1994, as part of the reinventing government initiative, city 
managers from different cities throughout the United States visited one another to 
establish performance benchmarks and help define how well they were doing business. 
For instance, the city manager of Austin, Texas and his staff visited Portland and the city 
manager of Portland, Oregon and his budget officer visited Coral Springs, Florida, 
examining the other cities’ processes. All cities that participated in the study have since 
implemented various practices from other cities in the study, where performance was 
indicative of a best practice. (NPR, 1999) State and local governments have also 
established a Community of Practice--the Performance Management Consortium of the 
International CityKounty Management Association. (NPR, 1999) Through this 
consortium, they learn from each other and can compare outcomes against those of other 
local governments. (NPR, 1999) 
A growing percentage of U.S. cities have performance measurement systems in 
place, which have resulted in more efficient and effective government. (Poister & Strieb, 
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1999) Most notable of the cities with robust performance measurement systems are 
Portland, Oregon; Charlotte, NC; and Sunnyvale, CA. (NPR, 1999) 
Sunnyvale incorporated a system of program performance measurement, into its 
budget system in 1973. Frank Hosdell, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Deputy Director for Management testified that, 
Sunnyvale’s system stands out as the single best example of a 
comprehensive approach to performance measurement that we have found in 
the United States. One underlying reason for the success achieved in 
Sunnyvale is the fact that every program manager uses the system to plan, 
manage, and assess progress on a day-to-day basis. (GPRA Committee 
Report, 1993, Sec. IV, p.1) 
Each year Sunnyvale’s city manager submits a detailed Annual Performance 
Report to the mayor and city council, indicating how well the performance objectives 
have been achieved. All those objectives, in turn, are tied into twenty-year strategic plans 
covering 28 areas of city services, showing long-term goals for the city. (GPRA 
Committee Report, 1993, Sec. IV, p. 1) 
Between 1985 and 1990, the city’s average cost per unit of service went down 20 
percent. In other words, its productivity increased by roughly 4 percent a year. In 1990, 
when it compared its own costs to those of similar size and type cities, Sunnyvale found 
that it used 35 percent to 45 percent fewer people to deliver most services. (GPRA 
Committee Report, 1993, Sec. IV, p. 1) Its employees were paid more, but its operating 
budget was still near the low end of comparable cities, and its per capita taxes were lower 
than those of any comparable city. In its most recent citizen survey, over 90 percent 
indicated satisfaction with the quality of city services. (GPRA Committee Report, 1993, 
Sec. IV, p.1) 
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The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) implementation may be 
difficult at first and may take awhile, but performance measurement can work in the 
public sector. City and state governments have proven that performance measurement 
programs can succeed in government organizations. 
B. THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993 
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 established a strategic 
planning and performance budgeting framework requiring federal agencies to develop 
strategic plans containing measurable performance standards. (Blackerby, 1994) Setting 
results-oriented performance goals linked to strategic plans is the Government 
Performance and Results Act’s (GPRA) central premise. In accordance with the act, 
Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense must now show results before new 
appropriations are made; automatic refunding will not occur. “The essential purpose of 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is to improve the effectiveness of 
the federal government and its many agencies, and improve Americans’ confidence in the 
federal government.” (Whittaker, 1995:60) 
Government agencies, such as the Navy, that never had to measure performance 
are working to analyze, identify and document how their budgets are being spent in 
consonance with their strategic plans. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) The 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires the Navy to draft strategic 
and performance plans for major programs, such as installation management, consult 
with congress and stakeholders on those plans and report to Congress annually on their 
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actual performance as compared with stated goals. (GPRA Committee Report, 1993, Sec. 
IVY p. 1) 
1. Strategic Plan 
The main elements of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) are 
the formulation of strategic and performance plans. Strategic plans are the starting point 
for performance measurement efforts. A strategic plan includes a comprehensive mission 
statement based on the agency’s statutory requirements, a set of outcome-related strategic 
goals, and a description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals. The mission 
statement brings the organization into focus, explaining why the agency exists, what it 
does and how it does it. The strategic goals that follow are an outgrowth of the stated 
mission. The strategic goals explain the purposes of the agency’s programs and the 
results they are intended to achieve. The clearer and more precise these goals, the better 
the organization is able to maintain a consistent sense of direction, regardless of 
leadership changes at the top. (GPRA Committee Report, 1993, Sec VII, p.1) This is 
particularly important in the Navy, where turnover in top-level positions occurs every 
couple of years. 
For strategic plans to be effective for the agency’s major functions and operations 
the organizations must involve their stakeholders, assess their internal and external 
environments and align their activities, core processes, and resources to support mission- 
related outcomes and objectives. (GAO-96- 1 1 8, 1996) Organizational leadership support 
of strategic plan development and implementation is essential if the plan it to be 
successfully adopted by the activity and its stakeholders. (GAO-96-118, 1996) 
2. Performance Plans 
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Under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), executive branch 
agencies are required to develop annual performance plans that use performance 
measurement to reinforce the connection between the long-term strategic goals outlined 
in their strategic plans and the day-to-day activities of their managers and staff. (GPRA 
Committee Report, 1993, Sec. VII, p.2) The annual performance plans should include 
performance goals of an agency’s program activities, a summary of the necessary 
resources to conduct these activities, the performance indicators that will be used to 
measure performance, and a discussion of how the performance information will be 
verified. (GAO-96-118, 1996) The performance plan establishes performance 
indicators to be used in measuring or assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and 
outcomes of each program activity. (GPRA Committee Report, 1993, Sec. VII, p.2) 
3. Annual Report 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) also requires federal 
agencies to report to Congress annually on their performance. (GAO-96-118, 1996) The 
annual report is essential to the performance budgeting process, as it allows Congress to 
evaluate program performance versus goals and to decide whether allocated resources are 
adequate or if the program should be discontinued. (GPRA Committee Report, 1993, Sec. 
VII, p.3) Also, the requirement to prepare annual performance reports is beneficial to the 
agency as it mandates that the agency examines its internal major activity’s performance 
annually. (GAO-96-118, 1996) 
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) first two attempts at both strategic and 
performance plans have not been well received by Congress. DoD scored a 29 out of 100 
possible points on its performance plan, second to last above the Department of State. 
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(Congressional Inst., 1999) The Department of Defense’s first annual performance report 
is due in 2000. DoD’s failure to formulate both satisfactory performance and strategic 
plans has placed considerable emphasis on program activities to improve plans and to 
provide a comprehensive performance report to Congress this year. (Congressional Inst., 
1999) 
C. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
How do our customers see us? At what must we excel? Can we improve and 
create value? How do we look to stakeholders/constituents? Getting answers to these 
questions of how effectively and efficiently (at the lowest cost) an organization is 
delivering services is the essence of performance measurement. The process is designed 
to yield information so that decision-makers can tell how effectively a program or service 
has used its allocated resources (Grifel, 1993) in comparison with other service providers. 
1. Establishing Performance Measures 
Organizations use performance measurement to determine whether they are 
fulfilling their vision and meeting their customer-focused strategic goals. According to 
the National Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPR) study conducted in 1999, 
performance measures must therefore meet the following criteria: . Ensure a narrow, strategic focus. The measures and goals an organization 
sets should be narrowly focused to a critical few. It is neither desirable nor 
possible to measure everything. In addition, performance measures should 
be directly linked to strategic and operational planning. 
. Measure the right thing. Before deciding on specific measures, an 
organization should identify and thoroughly understand the processes to be 
measured. Then, each key process should be mapped, taken apart and 
analyzed to ensure (1) a thorough understanding of the process; (2) that a 
measure is central to the success of the process chosen. 
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= Be a means, not an end. In a best-class organization, employees and managers 
understand and work toward the desired outcomes that are at the core of their 
organization’s vision. They focus on achieving organizational goals, by using 
performance measures to gauge goal achievement, but do not focus on the 
measures per se. (NPR, 1999, p. 22) 
2. What to Measure? 
Regardless of size, sector or specialization, organizations tend to be interested in 
the same general aspects of performance (NPR, 1999): 
. Financial considerations . Customer satisfaction . Internal business operations . Employee satisfaction . Community/stakeholder satisfaction 
Performance measurement typically includes measures of productivity, effectiveness, 
efficiency, quality and timeliness. 
Performance measures/indicators measure the quantity and accuracy of the 
work produced by a work unit, the efficiency with which it is produced, the 
level of customer satisfaction achieved, and the financial position of the work 
unit processing the workload or providing the service. (Louthain, 1995, p. 4) 
Performance measures can be divided into four categories; inputs, workloads, 
outputs and outcomes. (Joyce, 1993, P. 3) Inputs represent the resources consumed by 
operating a government program. Ultimately, they are used to hire personnel, build 
facilities, contract for services, and so on. Inputs are easily measured, usually in terms of 
dollars and personnel. (Joyce, 1993, P. 3) Examples of input performance measures are 
number of incoming recruits at Recruit Training Command, amount of fuel needed per 
month, or claims received. 
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Workload is defined as the amount of work performed, typically measured in 
terms of quantity. (Joyce, 1993, P. 3) Workload measures are often referred to as activity 
or process measures, for example, the number of evaluations processed, arrests made, and 
inspections or housing repairs completed. 
Outputs are the result of agency work and activities. Output measures are 
distinguished from workload measures in that workload is the amount of work performed 
and output is the result of that work. (Joyce, 1993, P. 3) An example of an output for the 
California Highway patrol may be safe highways. Unlike inputs, outputs are often 
difficult to translate into dollars partly because a market for agency activities may not 
exist outside the government and they are difficult to measure. 
Outcomes represent the degree of customer satisfaction and achievement of the 
broader goals of an agency. Outcome measurement concerns the extent to which the 
activities and outputs of the agency have their intended effect. (Joyce, 1993, p.3) That is, 
outcomes focus not only on the work performed but, more importantly, on the results of 
that work. Outcome measurement may cover activities that are largely under the control 
of program managers, or they may extend to an even broader set of measures 
representing results that the agency may influence, but does not achieve or control on its 
own. (Joyce, 1993, p.3) An example of an outcome measurement at a doctor’s office 
may be reduction of customer wait time by 15 percent. 
Examples of performance measures include employee and customer satisfaction 
rates, capital expenditure rates, return on investment, safety ratings, graduation rates, 
traffic flow rates, and service availability rates. Basically, a performance measurement 
can be a measure of any facet of organization’s mission. Schools judge performance on 
15 
test scores and graduation rates, while airlines use on-time arrival/departure and seat 
occupancy rates. 
3. Establishing a Baseline 
Once an organization has decided on its performance measures, the next step is to 
determine a baseline for each of the measures selected. Once data are collected for the 
first time on a particular measurement, the organization then has baseline data. (NPR, 
1999) Determining appropriate goals for each measure is the next step. A common 
practice is to set goals that will force the organization to stretch to exceed its past 
performance, but goals must be realistic and attainable or morale may be impacted. For 
example, a goal of 100 percent customer satisfaction is admirable. However, if the 
standard is eighty percent, a goal of 100 percent may not be realistically attainable. It 
would then be better to try for an 85 percent customer satisfaction rating, giving 
employees something to strive for that is most likely attainable. 
4. Gathering Performance Data 
Data are collected for each performance measure to determine if and how well 
goals are being met. It is very easy for this phase to get out of hand with the current 
advances in information technology. Therefore, organizations should remember that data 
are collected and analyzed for the purpose of getting answers to strategic questions not 
just for the sake of data collection. (NPR, 1999, Sec. 111) Important principals to 
remember when gathering data are to keep it focused, flexible, and meaningful. (NPR, 
1999, Sec. 111) 
Keeping data focused helps ensure that the right data and only the right data are 
collected, repetitions are avoided, and performance questions are answered. Flexibility in 
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1 data gathering methods is essential. Using a variety of source data and media usually 
leads to better performance measures at less costs because available resources are utilized 
vice implementing new ones. Data should not be collected just because you can. 
Numerous reports of meaningless data will hurt the overall collection process. 
Employees bogged down in too many meaningless measures will loose sight of what the 
organization is trying to achieve by the measures. A few well-aligned measures taken 
seriously are better than a number of complex measures or too many measures. (NPR, 
1999, Sec. 111) 
D. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT APPROACHES 
To measure something means to quantify it using a defined set of rules. 
(Ammons, 1995) Some things are more difficult to measure because they cannot be 
observed directly. But the basic process of quantifying something via defined rules 
remains the same, only the particular means for measurement will vary depending on the 
structure of the organization. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
sets a template for government agencies to follow in order to successfully implement 
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strategic performance goals and measures. (NPR, 1999) The tenants of the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) are not new, but are very similar to two 
approaches to performance measurement already utilized by private and public sector 
organizations; Benchmarking and Balanced Scorecard. (NPR, 1 999) 
1. Benchmarking 
Benchmarking refers to comparing several activities on the same measure to see 
who is best, finding out why that one activity is best, and then using the best practices as 
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a means of achieving better performance in your own program or service. (Ammons, 
1995) Knowing the factors that are important in effectively performing a particular 
service or function is the foundation of benchmarking. A performance measure is thus a 
baseline, standard, norm, or criterion against which users can assess their own 
performance in a program or service. Each performance indicator or “benchmark,” is one 
criterion underlying successful program or service performance. Performance 
measurement lets you quantifL whatever variables are selected as underlying the 
performance of a particular service. (Ammons, 1995) 
Developing performance measures begins with a clear statement of the program’s 
mission. Performance measures or benchmarks flow out of objectives and mission 
statements. (Kraft,1997) A mission is the reason why the provider exists, while goals are 
intended results that support the mission. Objectives are what must be accomplished to 
achieve a goal. Consensus on what a program does; who its customers are; and what 
these customers expect from the program or service is essential. (Kraft, 1997) 
Data are gathered to quantify each benchmark. Performance is then compared 
with others’ on each benchmark to identify who is performing best on particular 
benchmarks and who is falling behind. (Ammons, 1996) The next steps are to analyze 
what the best practitioners are doing that the organization is not, and to import best 
practices. (Kraft, 1997) Analysis and reengineering are important because trying to 
import or replicate a best practice as-is from one organization to another generally will 
not work. Not only can entire Organizations use benchmarking to compare themselves 
against other, similar organizations, but departments or services within an organization 
can also study the methods of similar units in other places. (Ammons, 1996) 
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2. Balanced Scorecard 
For many years, leaders at all levels in the private and public sectors have 
searched for the right tools and techniques to help them create high-performing 
organizations. The Balanced Scorecard, used by Advance Micro Devices and Analog 
Devices and documented in 1992 by Kaplan of the Harvard Business School and Norton 
of Renaissance Solutions, provided needed focus to the field. The Balanced Scorecard 
approach to performance management gained acceptance in the private sector as a way to 
build customer and employee data into measuring and ensuring better performance 
outcomes. (NPR, 1999) Balanced Scorecard transformed the way private sector 
companies could achieve and analyze high levels of performance and was critical in 
revitalizing such companies as Federal Express, Corning, and Sears. (NPR, 1999) 
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is a tool to translate an organization’s vision and 
strategy to effectively communicate strategic intent and motivate and track performance 
against established goals. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) A strategy is a shared understanding 
about how a goal is to be reached. Balancing an organization’s dimensions of 
performance allows management to translate the strategy into a clear set of objectives. 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996) These objectives are then further translated into a system of 
performance measurements that effectively communicates a powerful, forward-looking, 
strategic focus to the entire organization. (NPR, 1999) Measures are customarily used in 
four broad areas -- financial performance, customers, internal business processes, and 
learning and growth. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
The underlying premise behind the Balanced Scorecard is the need for a balanced 
presentation of both financial and operational measures. Financial measures provide the 
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results of actions already taken, while operational measures complement the financial and 
drive future financial performance. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) In combination, these 
measures provide a “balanced” view of overall business performance and bring together, 
in a single report, many of the seemingly disparate elements of an organization’s agenda. 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
Although designed for the private sector, Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced 
Scorecard could be useful in government planning. The first documented case of a U.S. 
city adopting a balanced measure approach was Charlotte, North Carolina. (Kaplan, 
1998) Charlotte operationalized their vision to be a “model of excellence that puts the 
community’s citizens first, where skilled, motivated employees are known for providing 
quality and value in all areas of public service” into the elements of their corporate 
scorecard. (Kaplan, 1998) Charlotte believes that implementing a balanced scorecard 
approach has helped to integrate common goals across departments and build consensus 
and teamwork throughout the organization. (Kaplan, 1998) 
E. SUMMARY 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) mandates implementation 
of a structured system of strategic goal setting, performance planning, performance 
measurement and reporting throughout government. Congress has made it clear that it 
intends to forge a more direct link between expenditures of public funds and achievement 
of beneficial outcomes. As a result, DoD is working on implementing strategic plans 
and performance plans that incorporate performance measurement and define 
performance metrics for its military bases. Performance measurement systems, such as 
benchmarking and Balanced Scorecard, have been successful in helping to at reduce 
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service cost and improve service quality in municipal government. The question is, can 
this approach work for Navy installations? This examines the process of defining 
performance measures for shore installations. The goal of this thesis is to recommend the 
best performance measures model for shore installations that can be used by regional 
commanders to improve performance in core areas. 
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111. NAVY IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter provides an overview of Navy Installations and their core businesses. 
Further, it examines the steps the Navy has taken to implement performance measures at 
shore installation in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) requirements. Finally, this chapter discusses whether these efforts have been 
successful and the Navy's future plans for meeting the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) requirements. 
A. NAVY INSTALLATIONS 
Since 1989, the Department of Defense (DoD) has placed increasing emphasis on 
operating the Department's base activities (versus mission forces) on a business basis. 
One of these major activities is providing installation services and facilities. In the 
United States, this "business" consumes roughly $40 billion annually, and manages assets 
that exceed $1 trillion at about 450 installations. (OSD, 1996) Our U.S. installations 
provide facilities and services to about 1 million active military, around 2 million family 
members, nearly 800,000 civilian employees and 1 million military retirees. (OSD, 1996) 
Yet, installation management has been very decentralized with few, if any, coherent 
operating procedures and principals to guide the over 400 installation and base 
commanders who receive little, if any, installation management training before assuming 
their duties. (OSD, 1996) 
On average, each installation commander is in charge of an activity which 
services 2,500 active military, 5,000 family members, 2,000 civilian employees, and 
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2,500 retirees, has assets in excess of $2.5 billion, and expends $100 million annually. 
(OSD, 1996) In their roles as base commanders, our officers touch the lives of every 
person on their installations and every person associated with the military in the vicinity 
of their installation. 
The Navy operates and maintains 1 10 bases worldwide. All installations have a 
similar array of supporting businesses, much like those found in most cities. Military 
bases grew up as America did. Because of the rural nature of the areas where land was 
found to support military operations, the military had to provide most of its own support. 
This support included eating establishments, permanent and temporary lodging facilities, 
stores, public works support, schools, recreation facilities, supply operations, hospitals, 
and so forth. These were especially important when the local community could not offer 
these necessities in quantities to support the increased population. Dozens of such 
businesses operate on nearly every military post today. Most of these activities have 
come to be considered part of the military compensation system. (OSD, 1996) 
While many aspects of any military installation are quite similar, significant 
differences among installations remain. These differences chiefly derive from the 
installation’s specific mission(s). For instance, the tempo of activities vary greatly 
among a research and development base, a depot, a fleet support activity, an air station or 
air base, a test range, or a large training base, whether this be basic, technical, combat, or 
flight training. Each also has unique demands on its support structure. As a result, 
installations provide similar support services, however have different organizational 
structures. There is no description of the many arrangements or relationships as practiced 
by the various installations or major commands. (OSD, 1996) 
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B. BACKGROUND 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, DoD budgets have declined significantly 
in real value. Despite four rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) activities, 
infrastructure reductions have not kept pace with declines in other parts of the budget. 
Consequently, most installations cannot afford to maintain facilities and services to 
established standards. Significant shortfalls in funding and an increasing maintenance 
backlog (estimated over $12 billion just in Military Family Housing) are giving military 
commanders difficult choices and could create significant problems, which may manifest 
themselves in declining enlistment or retention rates. (OSD, 1996) 
Funding priorities and other considerations have retarded the capacity of military 
installations to maintain (or even establish) information age infrastructure, both in terms 
of high speed, digital transmission systems across the base and software applications with 
standard data to support the horizontal business activities of an installation. The Navy 
must modernize its infrastructure, while simultaneously reducing the cost of that same 
infrastructure. (OSD, 1996) 
Business and management are important concepts for Navy installations. To 
survive, installations, like businesses, must be responsive to their customers, cost 
effective and well managed. To achieve savings and realize efficiency, the Navy’s Shore 
Installation Management (SIM) Division of OPNAV has focused on reengineering its 
business practices. SIM has focused considerable effort on initiatives such as, 
outsourcing, privatization, activity-based management, regionalization and performance 
measurement systems to realize savings and fund modernization. (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1995) 
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Outsourcing is buying products or services from external vendors and contractors 
which otherwise would be produced by internal staff. All Navy commercial activities are 
eligible for outsourcing. Currently, some Navy shore installations are conducting one or 
more commercial activity studies of their organization. Examples of shore activities that 
have been outsourced are public works, supply, food services, tug services and grounds 
maintenance. Privatization takes outsourcing one step further as it gets the Navy out of 
these businesses altogether. Privatization efforts are ongoing in military housing and 
utilities. (OSD, 1996) 
Activity Based Management (ABM) is a management tool that focuses on 
defining organizational processes and cost centers. ABM streamlines processes by 
identifLing and eliminating non-value-added activities. ABM can be a useful tool for 
establishing data baselines for performance measures. 
throughout the Navy. (Hanfi, 2000) 
ABM implementation is ongoing 
Regionalization efforts have consolidated the Navy’s installations into 13 Navy 
Regions. Each Region is responsible for creating economies of scale for the bases within 
its jurisdiction. Core installation functions have been combined and relocated, creating 
larger business areas. Regionalization has been cost effective in some areas, however 
major claimant exemptions, implementation variations and geographical disbursement 
has limited anticipated savings. (Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, 1999) 
The “Base Support Study,” conducted in 1996 by SIM, observes that installation 
managers must have better information to make management decisions if installations are 
to run more efficiently. Regional Managers likewise suffer from this lack of information. 
OPNAV has tried to improve the information situation by implementing Installation 
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Transfer and Exchange (INSITE), Installation Managerial Accounting Project (IMAP) 
and ABM. Strategic performance measurement, mandated by the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA), could provide the necessary information on 
installation activities, enabling installation managers to strategically address installation 
issues and manage more effectively. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) 
The DoD and the Navy have been working to develop base management and 
quality standards, in an effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of base 
management. (NPR, 1999) The Department of the Navy’s Strategic Plan states that naval 
bases must provide high-quality services to fleet units worldwide at a level necessary to 
sustain both personnel morale and combat readiness. To meet the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requirements, realize potential fiscal savings and 
ensure that the requisite levels of service are provided, measurable Navy-wide 
performance standards for key services need to be developed. (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1995) 
C. INSTALLATION MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING PROJECT (IMAP) 
Installation Managerial Accounting Project (IMAP) is an Assistant Secretary 
Navy Financial Management (FM) and Comptroller and Deputy CNO Logistics 
sponsored project that seeks to improve managerial accounting at the installation level. 
The Core Business Model was developed to provide more accurate and consistent cost 
accounting at installations within the official Navy accounting system (STARS-FL). The 
IMAP team uses the Core Business Model to define business areas, functions and 
27 
All Navy regions have adopted IMAP’s Core Business Model. The Core 
subfunctions that provide the basis for a Navy wide consistent approach to installation 
cost accounting. 
IMAP defines core business area, function and subfunction as follows: 
Core Business Area - An aggregation of related functions into a major area that 
produces the principal products and services directly supporting the command’s 
mission. The IMAP core business areas are airfield support, seaport support, 
other mission support, community support, facility management, public safety, 
and command support. (see Figure 1) . Function - A major process grouping made up of subfunction components. A 
function produces a related set of products. An example of a function under the 
core business community support would be Family Service Centers (FSC) and 
Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR). 
Subfimction - A grouping of activities into a process that produces or perfonns 
services. A subfunction is related to only one business area and function and is 
the lowest level considered for discrete cost accounting. When costs are incurred 
across multiple subfunctions and it is not practical to separately account for those 
costs, the costs should be charged to the single subfunction that is accountable for 
the largest portion of the cost. An example of a subfunction under the function 
FSC would be counseling services. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1996) 
. 
Business Model identifies installation core businesses and provides installation managers 
with a foundation for setting strategic goals. Knowing which functions and subfunctions 
are related to which core business will aid in developing performance measures that are 
tied to installation strategic goals. 
28 













Support Support Management 
Misc Support 
Utilities PW Management Force Protection MWR 
M# Support 
Cat A Activities 
Cat B Activities 
Cat C Activities 
Cliild DevProg 
In-Home Care 
















































































3ther Port Ops 






















I Preventive Maint 1 Environinental (1 MILPERS Services Supply 
M I  &- 
Procurement 




















Street Sweeping& Snow Removal 
Audidvisual- 
Printing Heallh Care and Retail Services are _ _ _ ~  
generally not funded by the installation 
Any suppon provided is included under 
“Other Mission Suppolt ” 19May 1997 
igure 1. Installation Core Business Model 
D. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS STRATEGY 
In 1994, the Navy established a Performance Standards and Measurement System 
Action Team (PSMSPAT) to review existing SIM processes and management tools and 
to establish and implement a performance standards strategy. In July 1995, the team 
released a draft Installation Performance Standards and Measures Strategy. 
In developing this Strategy the team made numerous assumptions, assessed their 
current operating situation, and conducted a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats) analysis. The assumptions taken into account by the team 
include the following: 
Defense budgets will continue to decline in real value. 
World events will require the maintenance of a strong and capable Navy. 
There is and will continue to be a pressing need to reduce the cost of operating 
Navy installations, yet maintain high standards of quality in terms of facilities 
and services to support Fleet readiness and her population. 
There is a tremendous need to determine the real cost of doing business in each 
functional area. 
Information is vital in order to distinguish the cost of “must pay” bills, 
infrastructure and technology investment costs, actual maintenance and repair 
costs, administrative costs and quality of life costs. 
All installations are different; what makes sense at one installation may not 
make sense at another. 
Installations have taken various horizontal cuts in both dollars and end strength 
over the last five years, and all non-controversial funding reduction solutions 
have already been implemented. 
The Department of the Navy supports the need to improve the quality of life 











There is not an adequate level of funding for Navy installations. 
There is virtually no visibility on the cost of various functions, processes or 
practices on installations since accounting functions focus on budgeting and 
expenditures of appropriations and not on what things really cost to operate or 
produce. 
Installations do business dissimilar to one another. Business decisions are 
based on different criteria. 
There is no single set of performance criteria to guide management decisions 
toward a defined goal. 
An array of computerized support exists without data standardization or 
integration. 
Numerous installations have a deficit in automated data processing and 
transmission capabilities. 
The PSMSPAT SWOT analysis on the internal and external Navy installation 
environment was used to determine what measures could be successfully implemented 
with current constraints. The following were determined to be their strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats to successful implementation. 
Strengths . All claimants agree on the need for improvements, economies and 
modernizing of installation businesses to provide better service and facilities 
within budget constraints. 
CNO leadership is committed to the PSMSPAT effort. 
Off-the-shelf automation and software is available for facilitating performance 
standards and measures. 
. . 
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Weaknesses . . Installation activities tend to get a low funding priority. Very little funding has been allocated for PSMSPAT development and 
funding has not been identified for PSMSmJSITE initiatives and 
I implementation. . Paradigm shifts must be made in the way people think, operate, and react to 
installation management requirements. 
Outdated ADP infrastructure and shrinking budgets may hinder 
implementation. 
Staff shortages and current management demands limit the availability of 
functional experts to support change activities. 
. 
. 
Opportunities . Installation Commanding Officers and managers are the best source for 
information and ideas for improving the business of managing installations. 
Threats . Failure to articulate needs and to cooperate among all Navy activities can lead 
to finding cuts by Congress or the DoD Comptroller staff. 
Any articulation of savings can lead and has lead to premature cuts in funding. 
Many functional stovepipes may perceive PSMSPAT issues and initiatives as 
threatening and could stymie innovative ideas for improving installation 
management. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) 
m 
The PSMSPAT’s resulting Performance Standards Strategy (1 995) for developing 
performance standards and measures recommended exploiting existing industry standards 
to speed development and benchmarking standards. The strategy also suggested 
combining expertise from the private and public sector with Navy Installation and 
finctional experts to expedite the implementation process. The development effort was 
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to include defining performance measures that measure installation progress in improving 
service delivery. 
The strategy dictated that Echelon I1 staffs work with Navy and public/private 
sector functional experts to develop standards and measures for installations. Installation 
Managers were instructed to utilize information tools such as Installation Transfer and 
Exchange (INSITE), Installation Management and Accounting Project (IMAP) and the 
Navy Accounting System STARS-FL to process information on existing functional data. 
INSITE is an information technology tool that incorporates information on Navy shore 
installations into one database that can be accessed by shore installation managers. 
IMAP includes the Installation Core Business Model, which defines the core businesses 
of shore installations: Airfield Support, Port Support, Other Mission Support, Community 
Support (QOL), Facility Management, Public Safety and Command Support. (Chief of 
Naval Operations, 1996) 
A finalized Installation Performance Standards and Measures Strategy was not 
found while researching this thesis. However, Echelon I1 staffs are still influenced by 
many of the issues discussed above. Developing performance standards and measures for 
Navy shore installations is still the responsibility of Echelon I1 staffs. Without any firm 
guidance from OPNAV’s Shore Installation Management Division, Echelon I1 staffs have 
adopted their own approach to developing visions, strategic plans, and performance 
standards. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) 
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E. SHORE INSTALLATION REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
PERFORMANCE MANUAL (SIROC) 
Although all Echelon I1 staffs were working to develop performance metrics for 
shore installations, Commander Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) N46 Shore Installation 
Metrics Program, initiated in late FY94, was the first to be implemented. The 
CINCLANTFLT metric manual was first issued in 1994. Subsequent experience in data 
collection and analysis led to a first revision of the metrics manual in May 1995; a second 
revision was issued October 1995 and Change 1 to Revision 2 was issued 30 November 
1995. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) 
In early 1996, CINCLANTFLT’s metrics program focused on expanding and 
strengthening the subset of metrics that measure mission required operational 
capabilities. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) In May 1996, a revised manual, the 
CINCLANTFLT Shore Installation Required Operational Capabilities (SIROC) Metrics 
Manual was released. More recently, Changes 1 and 2 to SIROC, issued 8 November 
1996 and 2 1 March 1997, respectively, were disseminated to reflect new data submission 
requirements, including deletions and modifications, and to adhere to IMAP’s core 
business model. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) 
1. Historic Metric Development Process 
Starting with the initial SIROC metrics manual in January 1996, the Metrics 
Program Manager formed teams to review and revise metrics and standards, and to 
develop new metrics and standards. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) These Metrics 
Action Groups (MAGS) consisted of a Metrics Team person, CINCLANTFLT Subject 
Matter Coordinator or other expert, representatives from Norfolk area installations, and 
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one or more support contractor personnel. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) MAGS 
were convened for each sub-function. 
Results of MAG decisions and recommendations were compiled into a draft 
SIROC Metrics Manual and distributed to all installations for review. (Commander 
Atlantic Fleet, 1997) Teams from CINCLANTFLT’s Metrics Team then visited each 
installation. Briefings were conducted and the comments and recommendations received 
were incorporated. The SIROC Metrics Manual was issued 17 May 1996. (Commander 
Atlantic Fleet, 1997) 
SIROC2 included a restructured Metrics Program to align functions and sub- 
functions with the major areas and functions, respectively, of the Installation Managerial 
Accounting Project (IMAP). As discussed previously, IMAP is an OPNAV N46 
sponsored project that seeks to define a core business model for naval installations. The 
purpose of SIROC2 was to provide background information and specific instructions for 
activities participating in the Shore Installation Measurement Program. (Commander 
Atlantic Fleet, 1997) The principal objectives of the Performance Measurement Program 
was to: 
m 
Promote benchmarking and continuous improvement throughout 
CINCLANTFLT’s shore infrastructure, its Regional Commanders, and shore 
installations. 
Assess shore installation readiness and operational effectiveness. 
Provide documentable justification for resource allocations. 
Identify deficiencies factually and consistently, and prioritize funding for 
resources, personnel, training, facility or equipment. 
Support near and long-term requirements using performance measurement as 
a management assessment tool in conjunction with other assessment tools, 
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such as CNO’s Installation Management Accounting Project and N46’s Shore 
Resource Building Blocks. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) 
SIROC2 combined CINCLANTFLT N46 level performance measurements with 
installation performance measurements proposed by Regional Commanders, base 
activities, CINCLANTFLT, TYCOMs, and support staff members. Regional 
Commanders were tasked with managing the shore performance measurements program; 
oversight was provided by CINCLANTFLT N46. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) 
2. Shore Installation Readiness 
The Shore Readiness Working Group (SRWG) was established in January 1996 
with a principal charter to represent shore infrastructure to the Shore Executive Board of 
Flag Officers and the Fleet Readiness Working Group (FRWG). (Commander Atlantic 
Fleet, 1997) The SRWG redefined shore installation readiness to allow interfacing with 
the Installation Managerial Accounting Project (IMAP) core business areas: airfield 
support, seaport support, other mission support, community support, facility 
management, public safety, and command support. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1996) 
The Performance Indicator program was designed to provide the statistical 
information needed to support shore readiness and the SRWG in performing its charter. 
The program included a comprehensive system of performance measurements in which 
all the critical functional elements of installation management and operations were 
represented. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) 
3. CINCLANTFLT N46 Performance Indicator Standards 
Assessing the readiness and effectiveness of participating CINCLANTFLT 
installations relied on standards to which reported performance indicator data could be 
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compared. CINCLANTFLT N46 performance standards were first applied in the last 
quarter of FY95, after proposed standards were submitted to installation representatives 
for review and comment during the August 1995 CINCLANTFLT Commanders 
Conference. Where appropriate, industry-based standards were used. (Commander 
Atlantic Fleet, 1997) 
A standards origin statement was included for each performance indicator with 
standards in the manual. (Commander Atlantic Fleet, 1997) See Figure 2. The standards 
were given four ranges of values, represented by a color ranging from green to red. This 
system is similar to the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) which has 
been used for assessing fleet readiness for over 25 years. The colors are defined as 
follows: 
green - M 1 - fully supports all functional requirements of the mission 
blue - M2- adequately supports all functional requirements, at some 
loss of efficiency 
yellow - M3- marginally supports functional requirements 
red - M4- non-supportive of functional requirements in some significant 
aspects 
3. Airport Throughput (Passengers) (cost): This measurement reports the military air terminal’s activity I 
level in terms of military and civilian passengers. It  may be used to gauge the activity level at the air 
terminal and to quantify the physical loading of the facilities. 
Definitions: 
number of passengers processed - the total number of military and civilian passengers processed through 
the military air terminal during the period. This number will include all flight initiations and terminations 
for transient and permanent duty station change passengers. Stopovers will be counted if customs 
processing is involved or if deemed appropriate by the activity. 
Reporting Criteria: Monthly, not cumulative. 
FormuIaAlata Reported: Number of passengers processed (#) 
Standards: None 
Standards Origin: NA 
Figure 2. SIROC Performance Measurement Example 
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To maximize the usefulness of performance measurements and to comply with 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), multiple layers of indicators 
representing levels of management oversight were established. (Commander Atlantic 
Fleet, 1997) 
5. Analysis of SIROC 
CINCLANTFLT claimants used SIROC until 1999. In 1999 CINCLANFLT 
reevaluated SIROCs ability to accurately assess installation performance as related to 
broad strategic goals. Assessing SIROC revealed that although it was a good start for 
establishing installation performance measurement it failed to equate metrics to strategic 
goals. (Salerino, 1999) SIROC depended too highly on performance measures used in 
the past. Very few of the over 142 measures contained in SIROC differed substantially 
from measures required for other Navy reports, such as Aviation safety quarterly reports. 
Further, metrics focused primarily on input, output and workload measures, not 
outcomes. (Salerino, 1999) 
To complicate matters further, strategic goals had still not been established. 
Therefore, CINCLANT FLT required performance measurements but could not analyze 
the data provided to see if they were achieving their strategic objectives. Therefore, 
SIROC was abandoned until completing installation strategic plans. Regional 
Commanders were instructed to stop reporting SIROC data and to expedite work on 
Strategic Business Plan development. (Salerino, 1999) 
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F. REGIONALIZED BUSINESS PLANS 
At the June 1999 Commander’s Conference, Commander Navy Region Mid- 
Atlantic briefed performance metrics for shore regions. The briefing proposed a vision, 
as well as a strategic plan for shore infrastructure. The briefing defines the Navy’s shore 
vision as follows: 
Focus: Supporting fleet readiness/recapitalization. 
Achieve optimal mix of service providers. 
Provide shore support from regional complexes. 
Continue to provide government unique services. 
Maximize the use of services from the surrounding community. 
Provide common services from competing providers. 
Train personnel to run regions like businesses. 
Replace risk avoidance with risk management. (Navy Region Mid-Atlantic 
Brief, 1999) 
Commander Navy Region Mid-Atlantic’s (1 999) proposed strategic plan simply 
states that shore regions should apply state-of-the-market business practices and reduce 
infrastructure cost. Infrastructure cost should be trimmed by reducing workforce: work 
force related expenses and physical plant costs. 
The plan recommends that installations use Activity Based Costing and 
Management systems to identify performance baselines and cost centers. The plan also 
suggests that all Navy regions use the IMAP core business model to standardize reporting 
and accounting. The briefing failed to outline a linkage between this plan and actual 
installation performance measures, and to date no performance measures have been 
developed. As of March 2000, Echelon I1 commands and all Navy Regions continue to 
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work on developing Strategic Business Plans and no performance measurement systems 
have been incorporated. (Hanfi, 2000) 
In October 1999, OPNAV N46 released the Shore Installation Vision 201 0 and 
strategic plan and goals. Vision 201 0 states; 
We are focused on supporting fleet readiness in its provision of joint 
forces. We operate in an environment that optimizes the mix of services that 
Government, industry, and the community provide. We provide the majority 
of shore support from regional complexes and other required supporting sites. 
Installations continue to provide inherently Governmental and other statutory 
requirements. They ensure access to services such as recreational facilities, 
food, housing, clergy, childcare, education, retail, and health care that are 
readily available within the surrounding community. Common services are 
executed by competing providers: the navy concentration host, regional 
contractors, and the local community. Competition drives cost down and 
quality up. Installations are overseen by military and civilians specifically 
trained for regional city management; their focus is on long-range planning 
and development to meet emergent mission and budget requirements. The old 
culture of risk avoidance has been replaced with a policy of proactive risk 
management. (Navy Region Mid-Atalantic, 1999) 
The OPNAV Shore Infrastructure Strategic Plan (1 999) identifies two major 
strategic issues with respect to installation management: apply state of the art business 
practices and reduce infrastructure cost. The plan further defines key accomplishments 
for each of these issues and sets numerous goal and objectives for each accomplishment. 
(See Appendix A) The plan’s goals are broad in nature, and objectives are geared more 
toward policy decisions and less toward actual day-to-day operation management of 
shore installation. Goals and objec‘tives are not directly linked to core business areas or 
any distinct performance measures. 
G .  SUMMARY 
While the Navy’s attempts to define a measurement strategy should be 
commended, it still remains unclear exactly how Navy shore installation’s should 
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implement performance measures. The lack of an overall Navy strategy coupled with 
intensified mission requirements and reengineering initiatives have hampered 
development attempts. Echelon I1 staff endeavors, such as SIROC, identified metrics but 
failed to link them to strategic goals. Meanwhile, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic’s plan 
develops a broad-based strategy but failed to identify performance measures. Although 
activity-based costing has been distinguished as a tool to identify cost centers and 
performance baselines, each organization must set its own strategic direction. Echelon I1 
staffs have yet to satisfy the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
requirements and keep form taking additional budget cuts in the future. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
This Chapter discusses the interview process and analyzes interview responses in 
three separate areas: knowledge and understanding of SIM concepts, current strategic 
planning efforts, and development of SIM strategic plans and goals for the future. 
Further, it presents a performance measurement model based on interview responses and 
archival research conducted on performance measurement. 
A. DISCUSSION OF THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
1. Purpose of Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with Regional SIM personnel (Code 
N46), Naval Postgraduate School SIM Students (877) and RADM Froman, OPNAV N46. 
These interviews were designed to gather data and assess current SIM strategic goals, 
performance measures and their implementation at individual regions. In addition, the 
interviews were used to identify specific SIM Strategic Focus areas, strategic goals and 
basic performance measures. The interviews were also used to ascertain the 
interviewee’s knowledge of basic SIM terms and programs, strategic planning, 
performance measures, and the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). 
2. Individuals Interviewed 
N46 Staff members were interviewed fiom Navy Regions Mid-Atlantic, 
Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, Hawaii and Europe. A total of eleven N46 staff 
personnel were interviewed. Staff members included eight military officers, each with 
over ten years military experience, ranking from Lieutenant Commander to Rear Admiral 
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and three Government Service personnel, GS-12 rating, each with over fifteen years 
experience in public service. RADM Froman, OPNAV N46 since October 1999, was 
also interviewed. Six of the seven SIM students at the Naval Postgraduate School were 
interviewed during their fifth quarter of a six quarter program. 
3. Interview Methodology 
Prior to the interviews, introductory information was provided to interviewees 
(See Appendix B). This package included background information on the thesis, the 
purpose of the interview and a list of interview questions. The interviews were 
conducted both in person and via telephone. The interviews were semi-structured, 
meaning that although questions were prepared in advance the interviewees were allowed 
to expand on issues raised. The interviews lasted between 25 and 50 minutes, the 
average length was 35 minutes. 
Content analysis was performed on the interview data. During content analysis, 
interview responses were grouped based on similarity. Groups were then prioritized. 
Priority rankings were given based on the number of respondents in each group. Groups 
with the highest percentage were considered significant. For instance, all 16 interviewees 
listed cost visibility as a strategic goal/objective, therefore it received a percentage of one 
hundred and a high priority ranking. 
B. DISCUSSION OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
1. Overview 
Interview questions were broken into three major areas; knowledge and 
understanding of the topic, assessing the current situation, and recommending and 
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identifying specific Shore Installation Management Strategic Focus areas, strategic 
goals/objectives and basic performance measures. Overall interviewees seemed eager to 
discuss shore installation issues and the strategic planning process. 
2. Knowledge and Understanding of the Topic 
The following questions were included in the interview to document the level of 
understanding and knowledge of those interviewed with respect to basic principals and 
tools of SIM, strategic planning and performance measurement. Without a general 
understanding of the organization, management tools and government guidelines, setting 
a strategic direction and selecting accurate performance measurements is not likely to be 
a successful endeavor. 
Question: Could you explain the requirements of the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA)? 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 established a 
strategic planning and performance budgeting framework requiring federal agencies to 
develop strategic plans containing measurable performance standards. (Blackerby, 1994) 
Setting results-oriented performance goals linked to strategic plans is the Government 
Performance and Results Act’s (GPRA) central premise. In accordance with the Act, 
Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense must now show results before new 
appropriations are made; automatio refunding will not occur. “The essential purpose of 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is to improve the effectiveness of 
the federal government and its many agencies, and improve Americans’ confidence in the 
federal government.” (Whittaker, 1995, p.60) 
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When asked to explain the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), 
only five of the ten regional staff personnel interviewed had heard of the Act; of those, 
only two could list the Government Performance and Results Act's (GPRA) 
requirements. Further, only one of the regional staff members could link the Act with 
current Navy mandates to draft and implement strategic and performance plans. 
However, all six of the SIM students and the one former SIM student were able to define 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), explain its requirements and 
discuss its impact on SIM. 
Question: What are SIM 's responsibilities with respect to GPRA ? 
Nine out of the ten regional staff members interviewed were unable to answer this 
question. Only a former SIM student was able to actually discuss the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requirements and its impact on current Navy SIM. 
All SIM students were able to articulate that the Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA) requires the Navy to draft strategic and performance plans for major 
programs, such as installation management, consult with congress and stakeholders on 
those plans and report to Congress annually on their actual performance as compared 
with stated goals. However, none of the students knew what OPNAV N46 or the 
individual Navy regions were doing currently to implement the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA). 
Question: What is a performance measure? 
If organizations use performance measurement to determine whether they are 
fulfilling their vision and meeting their customer-focused strategic goals, than their 
performance measures must measure the right thing. (NPR, 1999) Determining how 
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effectively and efficiently an organization is delivering services is the essence of 
performance measurement. Before deciding on specific measures, an organization should 
identify and thoroughly understand the processes to be measured. Then, each key 
process should be mapped, taken apart and analyzed to ensure (1) a thorough 
understanding of the process; and (2) that the measure is central to the success of the 
process chosen. (NPR, 1999) 
Performance measures can be divided into four categories; inputs, workloads, 
outputs and outcomes. Inputs represent the resources consumed in operating a 
government program. Workload is defined as the work performed, typically measured in 
terms of quantity. Outputs are the result of agency work and activities. Output measures 
are distinguished from workload measures in that workload is the amount of work 
performed and output is the result of that work. Outcomes include customer satisfaction 
and achieving broader agency goals. Outcome measurement concerns the extent to 
which the agency’s activities and outputs have their intended effect. (Joyce, 1993, P. 3) 
Two types of answers were given to this question. Eleven out of sixteen 
interviewees used efficiency measures, such as input, output and workload as examples 
of performance measures. Specific examples included: money expended, training hours, 
number of customers served, number of employees and percent of maintenance 
completed. The other five interviewees, including both students and staff personnel, used 
outcome measures as examples of performance measures. The outcome measures 
included customer satisfaction, training effectiveness rating, and employee satisfaction 
ratings. 
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Nine of interviewees stated that they had only a general knowledge of 
performance measurement, and had never developed performance measures for an 
organization. Three of the interviewees stated that they had worked with performance 
measures extensively but that most of their experience was in efficiency measures, not 
effectiveness. All respondents could articulate what a performance measurement is. 
However, only four had received any formalized training on performance measurement 
development. 
Question: Are you familiar with the Installation Management and Accounting 
Project (IMA P) ? 
The Installation Management Accounting Project (IMAP) is an Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Financial Management (FM) and Comptroller and Deputy CNO 
Logistics sponsored project that seeks to improve managerial accounting at the 
installation level. IMAP includes the Installation Core Business Model, which defines 
the core businesses of shore installations: Airfield Support, Port Support, Other Mission 
Support, Community Support (QOL), Facility Management, Public Safety and Command 
Support. IMAP also breaks down shore activities into functions and sub-functions under 
each core business. 
All ten regional staff personnel interviewed could list the core business models 
and explain the relationships between the core businesses, functions and sub-functions. 
Only one of the six SIM students could explain IMAP. Of the other five students, four 
stated that they had never heard of IMAP and one stated that he had heard of it but could 
not elaborate further. 
Question: What are the core businesses for Shore Installations? 
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A Core Business Area, as defined by IMAP, is an aggregation of related functions 
into a major area that produces the principal products and services directly supporting the 
command’s mission. All Navy regions have adopted IMAP’s core business model, 
illustrated in Chapter 111, Figure 1. The core business model identifies installation core 
businesses and provides installation managers with a foundation for setting strategic 
goals. Knowing which functions and sub-functions are related to which core business 
aids in developing performance measures that are tied to installation strategic goals. 
All the regional staff personnel interviewed could accurately list the core 
businesses for shore installations as defined by IMAP and accepted by OPNAV N46. 
However, only one SIM student was actually able to list all seven of the core business 
areas. The other SIM students simply discussed the different types of activities inherent 
to Navy facilities, such as public works, housing and security. 
Question: Are you familiar with Installation Transfer and Exchange (INSITE) ? 
The OPNAV Performance Standards Strategy (1 995) dictated that Echelon I1 
staffs work with Navy and public/private sector functional experts to develop installation 
standards and measures. Installation Managers were instructed to utilize information 
tools, such as Installation Transfer and Exchange (INSITE), Installation Management and 
Accounting Project (IMAP) and the Navy Accounting System STARS-FL to aid in 
processing information on existing functional data and to set performance measures. 
INSITE is an information technology tool that incorporates information on Navy shore 
installations into one database that can be accessed by shore installation managers. 
STARS-FL is the current Navy accounting system. 
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All sixteen interviewees stated that they had never heard of INSITE or used 
INSITE. 
Question: What education and training have you received on strategic planning, 
control systems or performance metrics? 
All the SIM students had received education through the Naval Postgraduate 
School on strategic planning, control systems and performance measures. The students 
stated that they had received thorough educational instruction on control systems and 
strategic planning, but only a basic instruction on performance measures. The regional 
N46 staff members had a varied education level on these topic areas due to diversity in 
experience and education. Eight of the regional staff members stated that they would 
require more education and training to adequately develop or implement strategic plans 
and performance measures. Three of the staff members stated that they were unfamiliar 
with control systems. Only two staff members had received any Navy training on 
strategic planning and developing performance measures. 
3. Assessment of Current Situation 
The following questions were included in the interview to document the 
interviewee’s understanding and the strategic planning activity in the current SIM 
organization. The ability to develop performance measures is directly linked to strategic 
plans and goals under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), therefore, 
in order for,Navy regions to meet requirements they must be cognizant of their strategic 
direction as set by OPNAV N46. 
Question: Are you familiar with the Navy’s Shore Installation Management 
Strategic Plan? Ifso, what are its main objectives? 
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In October 1999, OPNAV N46 released the Shore Installation Vision 20 10 and 
strategic plan and goals. Vision 2010 states; 
We are focused on supporting fleet readiness in its provision of joint forces. We 
operate in an environment that optimizes the mix of services that Government, 
industry, and the community provides. We provide the majority of shore support 
from regional complexes and other required supporting sites. Installations 
continue to provide inherently Governmental and other statutory requirements. 
They ensure access to services such as recreational facilities, food, housing, 
clergy; childcare, education, retail, and health care that are readily available 
within the surrounding community. Common services are executed by competing 
providers: the navy concentration host, regional contractors, and the local 
community. Competition drives cost down and quality up. Installations are 
overseen by military and civilians specifically trained for regional city 
management; their focus is on long-range planning and development to meet 
emergent mission and budget requirements. The old culture of risk avoidance has 
been replaced with a policy of proactive risk management. (Navy Region Mid- 
Atlantic, 1999) 
None of the six SIM students interviewed had ever seen the Navy’s Shore 
Installation Strategic Plan (1 999) and therefore were unaware of its main objectives. (See 
Appendix A) Only two of the ten N46 regional staffs members interviewed had copies of 
the plan, although three others had been present when the plan was briefed at various 
conferences and could articulate its basic tenants. 
The interviewees overall opinion of the plan was that it was too broad and that it 
did not adequately set a strategic direction for shore installations. All ten of the N46 staff 
members interviewed stated that the plan was not promulgated effectively nor 
disseminated correctly. Three of the interviewees also pointed out that the strategic plan 
was never marketed throughout N46 organizations. They stated that there was never any 
attempt to gain consensus or support for the plan. There was no one promoting the plan. 
The plan was only disseminated to a few and than forgotten; there was no opportunity or 
effort to get “buy in.” 
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Question: What are SIM’s strategic goals? 
The OPNAV Shore Infrastructure Strategic Plan (1999) identifies two major 
strategic issues with respect to installation management; apply state of the art business 
practices and reduce infrastructure costs. The plan further defines key accomplishments 
for each of these issues and sets goals and objectives for each accomplishment. (See 
Appendix A) The Navy has focused considerable effort on initiatives such as 
outsourcing, privatization, activity-based management, regionalization and claimant 
consolidation. In an effort to realize savings and fund Navy modernization, Navy shore 
installations have been targeted specifically. (Chief of Naval Operations, 1995) 
Reduce infrastructure costs and apply best business practices were listed by all 
those interviewed as the strategic goals of SIM. 
Question: What is your command currently doing to implement strategic and 
performance plans? 
SIM students were not asked this question. All eleven regional N46 staff 
personnel stated that their commands were developing strategic plans. All 
CINCLANTFLT staffs were working on drafts of “Strategic Business Plans,” which are 
not required to be linked to OPNAV strategic goals for shore installations. Although 
almost all personnel thought they were headed in the right direction, eight of the 
interviewees pointed out that they were rushed to come up with strategic plans to meet 
deadlines set by Echelon I1 commands. RADM Froman, OPNAV N46, stated her staff 
was revising the current strategic plan and that a working group with regional business 
managers was scheduled for April 2000. 
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Question: What role has OPNA V N46played in setting strategic direction and 
establishing performance measures for shore installations? 
All but one interviewee indicated that OPNAV N46 was responsible for setting 
the strategic direction for SIM throughout the Navy. All those interviewed stated that 
OPNAV N46 had been ineffective in communicating its plan, goals and objectives to 
regional staffs. Further, two of the interviewees stated that up to this point OPNAV N46 
was simply a conduit for broad Defense goals to reduce infrastructure. All those 
interviewed commented that OPNAV N46 needed to be more proactive in setting policy 
for SIM and less reactionary to pressures from higher authority. Three interviewees 
stated that OPNAV N46 might be more proactive now that RADM Froman had taken 
charge. 
Question: How important a priority are performance measures at your 
command? 
All interviewees stated that there has been pressure to develop performance 
measures, but they really were not a top priority. Three interviewees were still sorting 
out regionalization issues, which was their number one priority. Two others interviewees 
stated that concurrent ABM initiatives were their command's primary focus. All regional 
staffs were undergoing concurrent outsourcing and privatization studies, as well as ABM 
implementations. All interviewees stated that strategic planning and developing 
performance measures was just one more thing they had to get done. 
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4. Identification of Specific Shore Installation Management Strategic Focus 
Areas, Strategic Goals/Objectives and Basic Performance Measures 
The following interview questions were included to gather information and 
recommendations for defining SIM’s strategic direction and identify strategic 
goals/objectives and performance measures. Interviewee responses were used to 
formulate a model based on the Balanced Scorecard approach. 
Question: What should SIM’s strategic direction be? 
All interviewees stated that a SIM strategic direction needs to be set and marketed 
throughout the Navy. Four interviewees stated that Echelon I1 and regional commanders 
should be included in the process as the primary customers for shore installations. 
Although interviewee responses varied, the interview data suggest a consensus for four 
main strategic SIM focus areas: 
1. Focus on Customer 
2. Reengineer Business Practices 
3. Maintaidlmprove Current Infrastructure 
4. Reduce Infrastructure Costs 
All interviewees stated that shore management as a support organization should 
primarily focus on the customer. They defined the customer as the operational and 
support units located at their installations, service members, family members, retirees and 
the community. Interviewees defined “focused on the customer” as meeting customer 
demands and expectations, providing better service and improving quality of life. 
All interviewees agreed that SIM needed to reengineer its business practices to 
improve its current shore management processes and increase effectiveness and 
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efficiency. Interviewee examples included strategic sourcing, privatization, activity 
based management, and increased technical automation. 
All interviewees expressed concern over the current status of shore facilities. 
Eight interviewees suggested that resources needed to be dedicated to inspections, repairs 
and preventative maintenance for existing shore facilities. Nine interviewees pointed out 
that routine repairs and inspections were often moved to the unfunded list or to the next 
fiscal year at their command. 
All interviewees tied reducing infrastructure cost to reducing infrastructure. 
Fourteen of those interviewed suggested the need for an across the board analysis of 
current infrastructure facilities and their rates of utilization. They stated that 
underutilized, aged and condemned buildings are costly. All those interviewed felt that 
real cost savings could be achieved by reducing unneeded infrastructure and reorganizing 
base functions so that underutilized facilities are fully utilized and aged structures are 
closed or torn down. 
Question: What should SIM’s strategic goals be? 
Interviewee responses covered a number of issues. However, the data suggest 
that at least two thirds of those interviewed thought that the most prevalent goal should 
be cost visibility. All the regional staff members interviewed stated that cost visibility 
continues to be the number one problem for Navy Regions. Three interviewees 
commented that current budget constraints severely hinder SIM from achieving strategic 
goals without appropriate program cost visibility. Seven interviewees pointed out that 
the current accounting system is structured by fiduciary responsibility, not program 
activity, so actual cost of shore installation activities is unknown. 
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One interviewee gave this example; shore installations provide billeting and 
messing services for numerous claimants, Chief of Naval Education and Training 
(CNET), Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) and Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet 
(CINCPACFLT), to name a few. However, current cost data only illustrate the cost of 
operating billeting/messing, it does not show how much of that cost is attributable to 
BUMED, CNET or CINCPACFLT requirements. These cost data are essential to 
accurately portray real shore infrastructure operating costs. 
Other goals mentioned by more than half of those interviewed include: improve 
customer service/perception; increase IT compatibility; reduce unneeded infrastructure 
and assess facility utilization; decrease awaiting maintenance backlog; generate career 
development for shore installation managers; assess privatization, partnerships and 
strategic sourcing opportunities; streamline business processes; and increase excess 
capacity usage. 
Nine interviewees stated that SIM needed to improve customer (i.e., fleet, 
members of the Navy, dependents and retirees) service and improve the overall 
perception of shore infrastructure throughout the Navy. Those interviewees suggested 
closely tying shore resources to the overall Navy mission. Three interviewees stated that 
the Navy did not always consider shore assets as an essential part of the war-fighting 
mission; therefore, they were frequently targeted for cuts. 
IT Compatibility was a common theme throughout the interviews, as 14 
interviewees mentioned IT compatibility difficulties. Funding priorities and other 
considerations have retarded the capacity of military installations to maintain (or even 
establish) Information Age infrastructure, both in terms of high speed, digital 
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transmission systems across the base and software applications with standard data to 
support the installations horizontal business activities. (OSD, 1996) Regionalization 
highlighted differences in IT systems across differing installations. Efforts are underway 
in all regions to reduce legacy systems, incorporate IT standards and implement 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). ERP uses state of the art software development to 
allow incompatible systems to talk to one another. However, resource limitations have 
hampered IT efforts. 
All the interviewees stated that unneeded infrastructure exists throughout the 
Navy. Seven interviewees commented that absent another round of Base Realignment 
and Closures (BRAC), resources should be earmarked to destroy condemned buildings 
and consolidate underutilized buildings. Eleven interviewees stated that base utilization 
surveys should be conducted to assess building usage across regions. 
Awaiting maintenance backlog is a growing problem for many installations. 
(OSD, 1996) Despite four rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) activities, 
infrastructure reductions have not kept pace with declines in other parts of the budget. 
(OSD, 1996) Consequently, most installations cannot afford to maintain facilities and 
services to established standards. (OSD, 1996) Shortfalls in funding and an increasing 
maintenance backlog (estimated over $12 billion just in Military Family Housing) are 
creating difficult choices for m i l i t q  commanders and could create significant problems, 
possibly manifesting themselves in declining enlistment or retention rates. (OSD, 1996) 
Four interviewees had maintenance backlog as their number one goal. 
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Of those interviewed, fifteen stated that a robust training program is necessary for 
shore managers. SIM is not a career path in the United States Navy. Currently, shore 
installations are managed by war-fighters, who have no specialized training in SIM. 
Interviewees also supported continuing several of the current SIM goals: evaluate 
privatization, partnerships and strategic sourcing opportunities, and streamlining business 
processes. To achieve savings and realize efficiency, OPNAV N46 has focused on 
reengineering its business practices. SIM has focused efforts on initiatives such as 
strategic sourcing, privatization and partnerships to capture savings and fund 
modernization. Strategic sourcing is buying products or services from more efficient 
service provider at competitive prices. External vendors, contractors and internal staff all 
have an opportunity to bid for the position of service provider. All Navy commercial 
activities are eligible for strategic sourcing. Currently, Navy shore installations are 
conducting one or more commercial activity studies within their organization. Examples 
of shore activities that have been strategically sourced are public works, supply, food 
services, tug services and grounds maintenance. Privatization takes strategic sourcing 
one step further as it gets the Navy out of these businesses altogether. Privatization 
efforts are ongoing in military housing and utilities. Partnerships have been instituted 
between installations and cities throughout the Navy. Examples of partnerships are 
housing, gyms and daycare centers. Ongoing pilot programs are underway for fire 
service. 
Six interviewees pointed out that bases have excess capacity. Too much land or 
too many facilities for today’s military. One interviewee gave several examples of past 
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innovations with respect to excess capacity: grazing leases, housing and property leases 
and partnerships with cities. 
Question: What SIM areas need to be measured? 
All interviewees indicated that performance measures should be linked to key 
functional areas. Specific measures included: customer satisfaction rates for installation 
services, employee satisfaction rate, 20 percent reduction of awaiting maintenance, 
targets for utilization studies, excess capacity surveys, ABM implementations, 
reengineering efforts and ERP funding. 
C. INTERVIEW SUMMARY 
The interview data distinguished the following Shore Installation Strategic Focus 
Areas: focus on customer, reengineer business practices, maintaidimprove current 
infrastructure and reduce infrastructure cost. SIM strategic goals/objectives were 
identified as: achieve cost visibility, improve customer service/perception, increase IT 
compatibility, reduce unneeded infrastructure, assess facility utilization, decrease 
awaiting maintenance backlog, generate career development for shore installation 
managers, assess privatization, partnerships and strategic sourcing opportunities, 
streamline business processes and increase excess capacity usage. These focus areas and 
objectives were used in developing a SIM Balanced Scorecard. 
D. SIM BALANCED SCORECARD MODEL 
As discussed in Chapter 11, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) translates an 
organization’s vision and strategy to effectively communicate strategic intent and 
motivate and track performance against established goals. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
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Balancing an organization’s dimensions of performance allows management to translate 
the strategy into a clear set of objectives. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) These objectives are 
then further translated into a system of performance measurements that effectively 
communicates a powerful, forward-looking, strategic focus to the entire organization. 
(NPR, 1999) Measures are customarily used in four broad areas -- financial performance, 
customers, internal business processes, and learning and growth. (Kaplan & Norton, 
1996) 
Using the BSC approach and data collected during interviews with Regional SIM 
personnel (Code N46), Naval Postgraduate School SIM Students (877) and OPNAV N46, 
a SIM model was developed. Objectives were incorporate into a SIM Balanced 
Scorecard. The strategic objectives were grouped according to the BSC’s four 
perspectives. For example, cost visibility, assessing strategic sourcing opportunities, and 
assessing privatization opportunities were linked to the scorecard’s financial 
accountability perspective, while improve service quality was linked to the customer 
perspective. Based on interviewee responses the SIM model’s primary perspective was 
determined to be the customer, like the Charlotte case discussed in Chapter 11. A 
corporate scorecard as well as individual focus area scorecards allows the organization to 
recognize cross-functional objectives. Figure 3 illustrates the recommended SIM 
Corporate Scorecard. 
Individual scorecards were developed using each of the strategic focus areas, with 
the exception of the customer focus area. (See Figures 4-6) Setting the customer as the 
primary perspective throughout the corporate and individual scorecards accomplished the 
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Figure 3. Shore Installation Management Corporate Scorecard 
link strategic objectives to an individual focus area. For instance, the reengineer business 
practices scorecard includes the increase information technology compatibility objective 
in its internal process perspective. Performance measures were identified for each 
objective based on interviewee recommendations and archival research discussed in 
Chapter 11. Outcome based measures were utilized to determine customer and employee 
satisfaction. However, a mix of input, output, workload and outcome measures was 
identified for financial and internal process objectives. 
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The SIM model provides a framework from which to work. It relates SIM’s 
strategic focus areas to strategic objectives identified in the interview data. Strategic 
objectives are then linked to recommended performance measures. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the interview process and analyzed the interview responses 
of select personnel in three separate areas: knowledge and understanding of SIM 
concepts, current strategic planning efforts and development of SIM strategic plans and 
goals for the future. Further, this chapter identified Interviewees Strategic Focus Areas 
and objectives for SIM and incorporated them into a Balanced Scorecard Model for SIM. 
Conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis conducted in this chapter may 
be found in Chapter V. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Navy has been working to develop Navy-wide base management and quality 
standards to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of base management. The 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 established a strategic 
planning and performance budgeting framework requiring federal agencies to develop 
strategic plans containing measurable performance standards. (Blackerby, 1994) In 
accordance with the act, Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense must now 
show results. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires the Navy 
to draft strategic and performance plans for major programs, such as installation 
management, consult with Congress and stakeholders on those plans and report to 
Congress annually on their actual performance as compared with stated goals. (GPRA 
Committee Report, 1993) 
This thesis examines the Navy’s attempts to develop and implement performance 
measures for shore installations. The goal of this thesis is to recommend a performance 
measure model for shore installations that could be used by regional commanders to 
improve performance in core areas. 
A. NAVY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA) 
1. Conclusions 
There is a distinct lack of awareness regarding the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) and its impact on the Navy. As discussed in Chapter IV, only half 
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of those interviewed were familiar with the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) and of those only two could explain the Government Performance and Results 
Act’s (GPRA) requirements. The interviewees’ familiar with the Government 
Performance and Results Act’s (GPRA) were all SIM students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School or former SIM students. The SIM personnel interviewed are being asked to meet 
the Government Performance and Results Act’s (GPRA) goals and guidelines, but have 
little knowledge on the subject. 
As discussed in Chapter 111, attempts by regions to develop and implement 
performance plans have been constrained because there is no SIM strategic plan with 
which to link performance measures. Former programs, such as SIROC, contained too 
many measures. In addition, those measures were not linked to any strategic goals and 
thus failed to show any program results. Basically, regional staffs have been in a Catch 
22 situation: directed to establish performance standards, but not given any foundation or 
guidance on which to build or focus. Currently, regional staffs are working to develop 
strategic business plans. Hopefully, these business plans will contain performance 
measures that are linked to strategic goals. 
Based on interview data, the SIM leadership has given limited focus to the 
Government Performance and Results Act’s (GPRA) strategic and performance planning. 
During their interviews, regional staff personnel could not identify a point person or 
champion connected to strategic and performance planning. Interview data also 
suggested that regional staff personnel perceived OPNAV N46 as ineffective in 
developing and communicating an overarching SIM strategy. Specifically, interviewees 
stated that information had not been effectively promulgated throughout the community. 
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Considering that only one regional staff member possessed a copy of the October 1999 
SIM strategic plan, this perception appears to be supported. OPNAV N46 has drafted a 
performance standards strategy and a strategic plan, but interviewees maintain that there 
has been insufficient follow through, implementation plans and communication on the 
issue throughout the community. During our interview, RADM Froman, OPNAV N46 
since October 1999, stated that she was working with her staff to improve communication 
throughout the community. 
As illustrated by interviewee comments, regional staffs face increasing emergent 
demands through initiatives such as regionalization, activity based costing and strategic 
sourcing. Most regional staffs are still reorganizing after regionalization and some are 
not yet fully manned. According to interviewees, strategic planning and performance 
measures development has taken a backseat to more pressing issues. All interviewees 
stated that the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has not been a priority. 
In conclusion, establishing and implementing the Government Performance and 
Results Act’s (GPRA) strategic and performance plans for shore installations has been 
unsuccessful due to several reasons: limited knowledge about the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and its requirements, lack of focused leadership or 
a “Champion” and increased program demands on shore staffs. 
2. Recommendations 
Based on the above conclusions, to meet the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) requirements and successfully implement strategic and performance 
plans for shore installations, I recommend OPNAV N46: 
Set the strategic direction for SIM. 
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. 
. Take the lead on establishing strategic focus areas, objectives and measures 
for Navy Regions. 
. Convene a working group comprised of officers from all Navy regions to 
identify and establish SIM strategic goals. 
Involving officers fiom across the regions will aid implementation and build consensus. 
RADM Froman indicated during our interview that she has taken the initiative on 
strategic planning for SIM and has scheduled several focus group meetings with key 
personnel in the coming months. 
B. PERFORMANCE MEASURES MODEL FOR SIM 
1. Conclusions 
Through archival research and analyzing interview data, I have concluded that 
developing comprehensive performance measures for shore installations is not feasible at 
this time. Although there are several strategic plan working drafts there is no overall 
Navy strategy for shore installations. Even though OPNAV N46 released a strategic plan 
in October 1999, the plan’s elements were too broad and implementation has not been 
forthcoming. Lacking an established strategy concerning SIM has made it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible to establish strategic goals/objectives and subsequent 
performance plans and measures as required by the Government Performance and Results 
Act’s (GPRA). 
Nevertheless, analyzing the interview data identified several Shore Installation 
Strategic Focus Areas including: focus on customer, reengineer business practices, 
maintainhmprove current infrastructure and reduce infrastructure cost. Interview data 
also identified the SIM Strategic goals/objectives as: achieve cost visibility, improve 
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customer service/perception, increase IT compatibility, reduce unneeded infrastructure, 
assess facility utilization, decrease awaiting maintenance backlog, generate career 
development for SIM managers, assess privatization, partnerships and strategic sourcing 
opportunities, streamline business processes and increase excess capacity usage. 
As discussed in Chapter 11, the Balanced Scorecard has proven effective for 
public management organizations similar in structure to Navy shore installations. 
Therefore, it was decided a balanced approach would facilitate developing a 
performance measures model for SIM. The model, discussed in Chapter IV, provides a 
framework which links SIM’s strategic focus areas to strategic objectives identified in 
the interview data. The model also links strategic objectives to recommended 
performance measures. 
2. Recommendations 
Based on interview data and analytical research it is recommended the Navy: 
. Adopt a balanced approach in implementing the Government Performance 
and Results Act’s (GPRA). 
. Use the SIM Balanced Scorecard in Chapter IV as a framework to develop a 
more comprehensive SIM Scorecard. 
C. SHORE INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING 
1. Conclusions 
According to the interview data, there is insufficient formal education and training 
on shore management, strategic planning and performance measurement systems. SIM 
managers currently have no formal training program and or career pipeline. As indicated 
by the interview data, most SIM managers learn needed SIM skills through on-the-job 
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training. SIM students demonstrated extensive knowledge of SIM issues and 
management theories; however, their interview responses implied a lack of instruction on 
some basic SIM concepts. 
Although most of the regional staff personnel interviewed could answer basic 
questions on strategic planning and performance measures, there was limited knowledge 
about these topics. Further, personnel interviewed indicated that their peers’ subject 
knowledge was either on par or below theirs. 
2. Recommendations 
Based on the conclusions above, to improve education and training for SIM 
managers, I recommend the following: 
Institute a formalized training and career pipeline for shore managers. 
Enhance the current SIM Naval Postgraduate School curriculum to include 
additional instruction on SIM core business areas and SIM management tools. 
Provide training on strategic planning and performance measures development 
for all personnel involved in this process to explain of these principals and 
promote programs success. 
The recently established SIM Curriculum (877) at the Naval Postgraduate School 
is an effective medium to accomplish SIM education and training requirements; either 
through the full masters degree programs or intensified required short-courses for all 
regional N46 staff personnel. The 877 cumculum would benefit from increased 
emphasis on SIM core areas and management tools, such as IMAP and STARS-FL. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Performance measurement is a growing trend in the public sector and therefore 
provides many opportunities for future research. Concentrating on establishing and 
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implementing performance measures for shore installations, the following topics are 
suggested: 
. Case Study on OPNAV N46 Strategic Plan development and implementation 
Analyzing a Navy Region’s Strategic Business Plan 
Developing an implementation plan for a SIM Balanced Scorecard 
Identifling Shore Installation Performance Measures 
. 
All of the topics listed above would provide useful information to shore managers in 
meeting the Government Performance and Results Act’s (GPRA) requirements, 
achieving a performance based management system and identifying activity results. 
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APPENDIX A. THE STRATEGIC PLAN 
This appendix contains the OPNAV N46 October 1999 Strategic Plan for Shore 
Management. 
Strategic Issue 1 : Apply state-of-the-market business practices I A= 1 
Key Accomplishment I :  Create an organizational structure and process to 
accelerate positive changes. 
Goal 1: Optimize management structure to enable efficient and flexible 
operations. 




Continue to reduce the number of claimants who provide installation 
management policy and funding to an optimal number by 
eliminating management layers between claimants and installation 
managers, identifying opportunities for realignment in “stovepiped” 
organizations. 
Eliminate unnecessary inspections, reports, and other forms of 
oversight. 
Determine and implement the most efficient organization based on a 
regional installation management concept. 
Establish installation management career progression with associated 
multiyear curricula for professional development of military and 
civilian personnel. This curricula should include an internship with 
select city management. 
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Objective 5: Identify organization functions and training opportunities that the 
Reserve component can accomplish through peacetime contributory 
support. 
Goal 2: Develop and implement a process that motivates and accelerates positive 
change. 





Objective 6:  
Objective 7: 
Eliminate policies, laws, and regulations that inhibit or restrict 
change and inflate costs. 
Designate regional commanders as centers for innovation to 
encourage the rapid generation of innovative ideas and 
approaches. 
Promote the use of existing waiver programs to minimize 
overlapping policies and regulations and to eliminate outdated 
policies and regulations. 
Provide incentives to Commanders by rewarding efficiencies; 
consider options such as a 25% return on true savings generated. 
Drive decisions to the lowest level by motivating and enabling 
commanders to make more of the decisions affecting their regional 
complexes and installations with a vision towards long-range goals 
as opposed to short-tern objectives. 
Provide incentives to tenants to streamline processes and operate in a 
cost-effective manner. 
Review interhntra-service support agreements (ISSAs) to ensure 
adequate cost visibility and accountability. 
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. 
Key Accomplishment 2: Manage installations with the business 
perspectives of eficiency, competition, and 
customer satisfaction. 






Develop a base accounting system in order to understand the real 
costs of doing business at the appropriate levels. 
Restrict oversight and centralized control to regional managers. 
Provide common function management tools that promote near- and 
long-term plans to assess the contribution of services to mission 
effectiveness. 
Develop performance-based ISSAs that have adequate feedback 
mechanisms. 
At the broadest level possible, obtain services from the most cost- 
effective sources and execute services in the most cost-effective 
manner to sustain readiness. 
Goal2: Develop and use measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of 
performance (MOPS) focused on performance and results, not inputs. 
Objective 1 : Develop benchmarks of world-class MOE tools, other metrics, and 
required operational capabilities and capacities (ROCCs). 
Objective 2: Adopt state-of-the-market standards for commercially available 
services. 
Objective 3: Obtain a cost accounting system that identifies the full cost of 
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providing each service, utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
s o h a r e  that is designed to aid the management process and 
encourage fiduciary responsibility. 
Goal 3: Apply information management technology to reduce other overhead and 
fued costs. 
Objective 1: Apply approved practices from initiatives such as Smart Base to 
improve shore installation management and reduce overhead across 
the Navy. 
Objective 2: Exploit the use of COTS/GOTS technologies in order to improve the 
affordability of operations. 
Objective 3 : Evaluate and implement information management systems for 
reporting and tracking metrics for all levels. 
I I B. Strategic Issue #2: Reduce infrastructure cost 
Key Accomplishment 1 : Reduce wor/$orce cost 
Goal 1: Regionalize or consolidate base operating support (BOS) functions in 
navy concentration areas (NCAs) and stand-alone and overseas 
installations to eliminate redundant or excess billets from activities that 
perform similar functions. Create regionalllocal pools from which tenant 
activities can obtain common services less expensively than if they 
performed those functions in-house. 
Objective 1 : Conduct and implement regionalization analyses in NCAs, CONUS 
stand-alone installations, and overseas installations. Include all 
Services in the discussions. Make the analysis increasingly more 
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sophisticated and complete. Conduct regional analyses at least once 
every 5 years. 
Objective 2: IdentifL opportunities to consolidate higher level functions across 
regions using the N4 Optimizing Shore Support Infrastructure 
(OSSI) Model that focuses on cost rather than 
functions. 
Goal 2: In conjunction with regionalization/consolidation analyses, continue to 
reduce operating costs by streamlining operations, determining the right 
source (including Government and non-Government sources), and 
eliminating functions no longer required. Ask “What must the 
Government own and what can it rent to supply effective shore support?”. 
Choose and act accordingly. 
Objective 1 : Review installation and tenant functions to identify opportunities to 
consolidate, realign, or eliminate functions available within the 
community or no longer required. 
Objective 2: Perform functional analyses to ascertain which are inherently 
Governmental versus non-Govemmental functions, then perform 
“make vs. buy” analyses to choose and buy non-Governmental 
functions fi-om the best source. Use competitive sourcing, 
functionality assessments, privitization, and dual use of facilities. 
Objective 3: Determine the optimal process for executing Governmental functions 
by focusing on readiness and most eflicient 
organizations. 
Goal 3: Regionalize the base infrastructure for the best service interoperability at 
the lowest cost. 
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Objective 1: Site weapons systems and specialized or unique support 
infrastructure based on common equipment vice Service 
considerations (for example, Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
(JAST)-based aircraft). Default to a lead Service in the case of a 
Joint weapon system. 
Key Accomplishment 2: Reduce wori$orce-related expenses, including 
costs of goods and services. 
Goal 1: Invest in information technology that enables the workforce to perform 
equal or better service less expensively. 
Objective 1 : Develop information management systems for centralized planning 
capabilities. 
Substitute teleconferencing for travel. Objective 2: 
Objective 3 : Establish virtual offices through telecommuting. 
Goal 2: Realize savings from workforce cost reduction initiatives. 
Objective 1 : Reduce consumption of materials and utilities. 
Objective 2: Assess the savings from homebasing. 
Objective 3 : Optimize maintenance required for remaining facilities. 
Objective 4: Outsource or “civilian substitute” heartland, stand-alone installations 
to eliminate the need for QOL support services required by military 
presence (e.g.,. galleys, housing, MWR). 
Goal 3: Find more cost-effective ways to provide perceived entitlements, benefits, 
and other QOL services. 
Objective 1 : Partner with neighboring communities to eliminate duplicate 
functions inside the fence line, 
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Objective 2: Privatize, outsource, or civilianize where cost-effective. 
Objective 3 : Incentivize individuals to obtain entitlements, benefits, and other 
QOL expectations on their own. 
Key Accomplishment 3: Reduce physical plant costs. 
Goal 1: Reduce the proliferation of redundant facilities within NCAs. 
Objective 1 : Consolidate the streamlined workforce into fewer facilities. 
Objective 2: Perform regional planning for multipurpose or multicustomer 
facilities. 
Goal 2: Maintain a minimal infrastructure footprint, based on the outyear 
projection of utilization requirements. 
Objective 1: Accelerate demolition of unneeded, aging facilities that cannot be 
cost-effectively retrofitted for continued service. 
Objective 2: Divest the service of excess infrastructure and property. 
Objective 3: Outlease not currently needed real property that is judged necessary for 
mobilizatiodsurge capacity, both to ensure the property is maintained 
and to generate revenue or services in kind for the installation. Support 
efforts to modify current outleasing law to maximize flexibility in use 
of in-kind services. 
Goal 3: Establish long-term relationships with the private sector by capitalizing 
or  funding investment programs that are integral to the way we operate 
our physical plants for the purpose of long-term payback. 
Objective 1 : Invest in energy conservation programs. 
Objective 2: Invest in hazardous materials management programs. 
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Objective 3: Invest in waste management and recycling programs. 
Objective 4: Invest in technology programs that increase efficiency and reduce 
manning requirements. 
Objective 5 :  Invest in environmental restoration and cleanup programs. 
Goal 4: Incorporate life-cycle cost (LCC) analyses for all future acquisitions and 
facilities. 
Objective 1: Develop a means to accurately predict LCC and projected return on 
investment. 
Objective 2: Incorporate an LCC model into all acquisitiodprocurement or 
constructiodmajor renovation plans to ensure adequate design, 
construction, training, operation, maintenance, and final disposition 
support for the design life of the system. 
Objective 3: Develop and implement an optimal maintenance program to enable 
systems, structures, and equipment to reach their design life. 
Objective4: Develop a culture that allows the return of a minimum of 2.5% of 
current plant value for maintenance. 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW INFORMATION PACKAGE 
This appendix contains a sample of the information package sent to interviewees 
prior to scheduled interview. 
From: LT Karan A. Schriver, USN 
To: 
Subj: PERFORMANCE MEASURES INTERVIEW 
1. Introduction: 
Postgraduate School. The following information is provided so that you will be familiar 
with the research objectives prior to the start of the interview. 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of my thesis research at the Naval 
2. Area or Research: 
In any era of declining budgets and increased resource accountability, it has been 
increasingly important to identify Shore Installation core performance areas and set 
performance measurement standards. This thesis will examine the process of defining 
performance measure for shore installation. The goal of this thesis is to recommend the 
best performance measures model for shore installations that can utilized by regional 
commanders to improve performance in core areas. 
3. Discussion: 
In recent years, an understanding has emerged that the federal government needs to 
run more like a business. As companies are accountable to shareholders, the federal 
government is accountable to taxpayers. Under the Government Performance and 
Results act of 1993 (GPRA) every major federal agency must be able to set goals, 
measure performance, and report on their accomplishments. 
The Navy has been working to develop Navy-wide base management and quality 
standards, in an effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of base management. 
The Department of the Navy’s Strategic Plan delineates that Naval bases must provide 
high-quality services to fleet units worldwide at a level necessary to sustain both 
personnel morale and combat readiness. To meet Results Act requirements, realize 
potential fiscal savings and ensure that the requisite levels of service are provided, 
measurable Navy wide performance standards for key services must be developed. 
According to the Navy’s Shore Installation Management Directorate, OPNAV N46, 
the Navy has had difficulty establishing baselines for Shore Installation performance 
measurement because of a lack of measurement data and business experience. In an 
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effort to overcome this, OPNAV N46 established a Performance Standards and 
Measurement System Action Team to review existing Shore Installation Management 
processes and management tools and to establish and implement a Performance 
Standards Strategy. OPNAV’s Performance Standards Strategy states that it will take 
advantage of existing industry standards to speed development and benchmarking 
standards. The strategy also suggests combining expertise from the private and public 
sector with Navy Installation and functional experts to expedite the process. 
Newly regionalized Echelon I1 staffs were directed to work with Navy and 
public/private sector functional experts to develop standards and measures for 
installations. 
Installations Managers have been instructed to utilize information tools such as 
Installation Transfer and Exchange (INSITE), Installation Management and Accounting 
Project (IMAP), Navy Accounting System STARS-FL as well as Smart Base initiatives 
such as Multi-technology Automated Reader Card (MARC) to aid in processing 
information on existing functional data. IMAP includes the Installation Core Business 
Model, which defines the core businesses of shore installations: Airfield Support, Port 
Support, Other Mission Support, Community Support (QOL), Facility Management, 
Public Safety and Command Support. 
Although the Core Business Model defines shore installation core businesses, and 
tools are identified for collecting data, measurement criteria are nonexistent. Guidance 
has not been identified to Installation Commanders on what they are supposed to 
measure, what criteria are important and against whom to benchmark. Also, promised 
management tools such as INSITE have so far been unavailable or underutilized due to 
lack of training or understanding of their functionality. 
4. Scope of Interview: 
These semi-structured interviews with SIM staff and students will attempt to identify 
SIM Strategic goals and performance measures. Further the interview will attempt to 
ascertain the interviewees level of understanding of basic SIM terms and programs with 
respect to performance measures implementation. 
KARAN A. SCHRIVER 
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Interview Questions 
1. Are you fmiliar with the Navy’s Shore Installation Management Strategic Plan? 
If so, what are its main objectives? 
2. What should SIM’s strategic direction be? 
3. What are SIM’s strategic goals? 
4. What should SIM’s strategic goals be? 
5 .  Could you explain the requirements of the Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA)? 
6.  What are SIM’s responsibilities with respect to GPRA? 
7. What is your command currently doing to implement strategic and performance 
plans? 
8. What is a performance measure? 
9. What SIM areas need to be measured? 
10. What are the core businesses for Shore Installations? 
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1 1. Are you familiar with IMAP? 
12. Are you familiar with INSITE? 
13. What training have you received on strategic planning, control systems or 
performance metrics? 
14. What role has N46 played in setting strategic direction and establishing 
performance measures for shore installations? 
15. Will SIM successfully implement performance measures? 
16. How important a priority are performance measures at your command? 
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